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STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS 
ON CONCEALED CARRY: 
A FIVE-CIRCUIT SHOOT-OUT 
Justine E. Johnson-Makuch* 
 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified a 
citizen’s core Second Amendment right to keep a firearm at home; however, 
the Court left open the question of how the Second Amendment applies 
beyond the home.  Since Heller, lower courts have struggled to determine 
the constitutionality of concealed carry laws in light of this new 
understanding of the Second Amendment. 
Many states have enacted laws that restrict a citizen’s ability to obtain a 
concealed carry permit, and some of the restrictions are not controversial, 
such as the requirements to be above a certain age and have a clean 
criminal record.  However, concealed carry laws also involve more 
contentious requirements, such as New Jersey’s “justifiable need” and New 
York’s “good cause” requirements.  One concealed carry law reviewed by 
lower courts was so restrictive that it amounted to a full ban on carrying 
firearms in public.  Citizens who have been denied concealed carry permits 
challenged the constitutionality of these laws. 
This Note summarizes five federal circuits’ decisions regarding such 
challenges to statutory restrictions on concealed carry of handguns.  Three 
of these circuit courts found the laws constitutional, while two held that the 
laws were unconstitutional.  After this Note considers how each court 
reached its decision and why these courts reached differing results, it 
ultimately evaluates and critiques the circuit court opinions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On a September evening in 2013, two men shot each other dead in Ionia, 
Michigan during an escalated instance of road rage.1  One man began 
tailgating the other while driving on the highway before the two eventually 
stopped in a nearby parking lot.2  They stepped out of their vehicles, pulled 
out handguns, and fatally shot each other.3  Police later learned that both 
men had valid permits to carry concealed firearms.4  One man’s permit had 
been revoked in 2006 after a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the 
influence and carrying a firearm in his vehicle; however, he received a new 
license in 2010 upon reapplying.5  In Michigan, citizens may be issued a 
permit to carry a concealed handgun so long as they are over age twenty-
one, have taken a gun safety class, and meet various requirements such as 
 
 1. Kami Dimitrova, Two Michigan Drivers Shoot and Kill Each Other After Road Rage 
Incident, ABC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/ 
2013/09/two-michigan-drivers-shoot-and-kill-each-other-after-road-rage-incident/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Hunter Stuart, 2 Concealed Carry Holders Kill Each Other in Road Rage Incident, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/09/19/michigan-concealed-carry-road-rage-two-dead_n_3956491.html. 
 5. See Dimitrova, supra note 1. 
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having no felony convictions or mental illness diagnoses.6  Had the permit 
requirements been more restrictive, it is possible neither man would have 
been carrying a handgun.  Rather, non-permit–carrying Michigan citizens 
are required by law to store their firearms locked in a special case in the 
trunks of their cars.7 
The number of concealed carry permits has grown exponentially in the 
past decade.  In 1999, there were 2.7 million concealed carry permit holders 
in the United States; however, by June 2014, roughly 11.1 million citizens 
owned concealed carry permits.8 
This dramatic scene illustrates the effect that state-specific concealed 
carry requirements can have on preventing confrontations that turn deadly.  
An extreme reaction to this incident might be to ban access to firearms 
altogether.  However, state laws that limit access to firearms typically have 
been challenged by citizens in defense of their Second Amendment rights.9  
Nevertheless, the laws that enabled these men to carry concealed weapons 
had life-ending consequences and thus deserve critical analysis. 
This Note reviews how federal circuit courts have analyzed challenges to 
states’ statutory restrictions on carrying concealed weapons.  Specifically, it 
considers how various circuit courts have come to either accept or reject 
more stringent requirements for obtaining a concealed carry permit.  When 
evaluating the constitutionality of a concealed carry law, most courts 
employ the same two-prong test;10 however, courts have reached varying 
conclusions due to factors such as legislative deference and the stringency 
of a particular state’s regulation. 
Part I of this Note begins by providing a historical summary of the 
Second Amendment as discussed by both legal scholars and the U.S. 
Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.11  This part next examines 
the history of concealed carry laws in the United States.  It then provides a 
snapshot of current state concealed carry laws.  Part I concludes by 
articulating a two-part test used by courts when evaluating the 
constitutionality of a firearm regulation.  Part II summarizes three different 
conclusions courts have reached when analyzing the first prong of this test:  
whether or not the Second Amendment right extends beyond the home.  
Part III first identifies the appropriate standard of review when courts 
consider a challenge to a state’s heightened requirement for obtaining a 
concealed carry permit.  It then analyzes a split among five circuits by 
evaluating courts’ differing results in their application of the second prong 
of the two-step inquiry:  whether or not the statute in question survives 
under the appropriate level of scrutiny.  Part IV evaluates the competing 
 
 6. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b (West 2012). 
 7. See Stuart, supra note 4. 
 8. See CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR., CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS 
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 5 (2014). 
 9. This Note will discuss five such challenges, including those against the concealed 
carry laws of New York, Maryland, New Jersey, California, and Illinois. 
 10. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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circuits’ views and ultimately concludes that courts should defer to the 
legislature only after exercising critical judgment.  This can be achieved by 
demanding that the state satisfy its burden of proof by referencing empirical 
evidence the state legislature used in making its policy decision. 
I.   THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
AND FIREARM REGULATIONS 
This part begins by providing a brief history of the Second Amendment, 
referencing both scholarly literature as well as the Supreme Court’s 
historical analysis in Heller.  This part then reviews the Heller decision 
itself, considering both the majority’s and dissent’s conclusions.  Next, this 
part reviews the history of concealed carry laws, indicating a longstanding 
practice of firearm regulation in public.  It then surveys current concealed 
carry statutes relevant for this Note’s discussion in Part III; these statutes 
define specific terms under which citizens may carry concealed weapons.  
This part concludes by defining the two-prong test many courts use to 
analyze a plaintiff’s challenge to state firearm regulations, including 
challenges to state requirements for obtaining a concealed carry permit. 
A.   Heller and the Historical Basis of the Second Amendment 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.12 
Prior to District of Columbia v. Heller, the last time the Supreme Court 
interpreted the Second Amendment was in United States v. Miller13 nearly 
seventy years earlier.  In Miller, the Court held that possession of weapons 
is a constitutionally protected right only if it has “some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”14  
Heller was a pivotal case in that it fundamentally changed the Court’s 
orientation toward the Second Amendment.  Under Miller, the Second 
Amendment afforded protection only for those arms having a nexus to 
militia, while under Heller, that nexus became self-defense.15  While Heller 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 13. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 14. Id. at 178. 
 15. Compare id. (holding arms must have a connection to “preservation or efficiency of 
a well regulated militia”), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding individuals have the right to 
bear arms in their homes for the purpose of self-defense).  In Heller, the plaintiff sought an 
injunction against (1) enforcement of the bar on handgun registration, (2) the licensing 
requirement that prohibited the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and 
(3) the trigger-lock requirement that prohibited the use of “functional firearms within the 
home.” Id. at 575–76.  The District of Columbia’s statute was not an explicit ban on 
firearms; however, in practice, the laws barred any citizen from carry a handgun.  D.C. 
prohibited people from having handguns if the weapons were not registered, and a different 
provision of the code prohibited registration of handguns. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01(a), 
.02(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2008).  Another provision outlawed the carrying of handguns in public 
without a license, but D.C. would not issue licenses. See D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1554 (2009) 
(“It is common knowledge . . . that with very rare exceptions licenses to carry pistols have 
not been issued in the District of Columbia for many years and are virtually unobtainable.” 
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held that the Second Amendment codified a right to bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense, it quite explicitly limited this holding to the 
home.16 
In Heller, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of history.17  
Ultimately, the key question in the debate was:  “Did the Founders seek to 
protect the right of citizens to bear arms in a well-regulated militia 
controlled by the states, or did they seek to codify the common law right of 
self-defense?”18  Thus, understanding the Framers’ rationale for the Second 
Amendment and its meaning in the historical setting may help to illuminate 
the current firearms landscape. 
During the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, most 
delegates welcomed a nationalist model of a stable and strong federal army 
as our nation’s primary means of defense.19  The Anti-Federalists advocated 
for state control over militias to protect against an overbearing federal 
government that could infringe upon individual liberties.20  The Convention 
reached a compromise, allowing the states to oversee and train their militias 
while reserving power for the federal government to organize and arm the 
militias.21  The Second Amendment’s protection of the right to keep and 
bear arms was born out of this political debate over federalism versus state 
rights.22 
Two theories have emerged regarding the type of right secured by the 
Second Amendment:  (1) the individual rights theory and (2) the collective 
rights theory.23  A proponent of the individual rights theory believes that the 
Second Amendment’s prefatory clause24 indicates that a militia preserves 
 
(alteration in original) (citing Bsharah v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 996 n.12 (D.C. 
1994))).  One critic noted the irony, in that “it is a bit like having a right to free speech, but 
being barred from opening your mouth.” Winkler, supra, at 1554. 
 16. See Heller, 554 U.S at 635; see also Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All:  Heller 
and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1494 (2014). 
 17. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
 18. Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, Introduction:  The D.C. Gun Case, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL:  CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER 9 
(Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013) [hereinafter THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON 
TRIAL]. 
 19. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA:  THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 39–41 (2006). 
 20. See id. at 3, 40. 
 21. See id. at 43 (making the militia a “creature of both the states and the new national 
government”). 
 22. See id. at 41. 
 23. See id. at 1–2 (“Partisans of gun rights argue that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, recreation, and, if necessary, to take 
up arms against their government.  Gun control advocates also claim to have history on their 
side and maintain with equal vigor that the Second Amendment simply protects a collective 
right of the states.”); Benjamin H. Weissman, Note, Regulating the Militia Well:  Evaluating 
Choices for State and Municipal Regulators Post-Heller, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3481, 3492–
93 (2014) (noting that the “Second Amendment clearly guarantees some sort of right that can 
be enforced by individuals,” but that the conflict is specifically over the scope of that right). 
 24. The Second Amendment is divided into two clauses:  the prefatory clause (“A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) and the operative clause 
(“the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed”). U.S. CONST. amend. 
II. 
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individual liberties more than a standing army does.25  In addition, an 
individual rights theorist believes that individuals have a right to keep and 
bear arms for many reasons, one of which may be to participate in a 
militia.26  Individual rights theorists also argue that the Second Amendment 
confers individual rights because both the First Amendment and the Fourth 
Amendment, which award individual rights, invoke “the people” 
language.27  If one reads the Second Amendment to establish merely the 
right of an individual to participate in a militia as opposed to an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms, then Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution28 would essentially place control of militias within the federal 
government’s grasp—the opposite of the intended consequence.29 
Collective rights theorists would argue that the Second Amendment was 
in fact intended to counter congressional power granted by Article 1, 
Section 8.30  Therefore, according to the collective rights theory, the right 
conferred by the Second Amendment should be viewed as restricting 
Congress’s power by providing for a well-regulated militia of the people.31  
In the eyes of collective rights theorists, the fact that the Second 
Amendment is placed in the Bill of Rights next to the First Amendment is 
further evidence that Second Amendment was intended to restrict the power 
of Congress rather than the power of states and their respective militias.32 
Individual rights advocates, however, substantiate their view with state 
court decisions and state legislative actions from the nineteenth century in 
which the individual rights interpretation prevails.33  The historical 
discussion over individual versus collective rights is unsettled and has 
spawned fervent commentary,34 notwithstanding the Supreme Court 
majority’s explicit endorsement of the individual rights theory in Heller.35 
 
 25. See BRIAN DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON TRIAL:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BATTLE 
OVER THE SECOND AMENDMENT 9 (2008). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may 
be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the 
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress.”). 
 29. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 10. 
 30. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  THE INTENT AND ITS 
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 23–24 & n.50 (2009). 
 31. See id.; see also Petrovski v. Fed. Express Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 n.5 (N.D. 
Ohio 2002) (explaining that because the Second Amendment “applies only to the right of the 
State to maintain a militia . . . the Amendment only guarantees a ‘collective’ right rather than 
an ‘individual’ right” (citation omitted)). 
 32. See CHARLES, supra note 30, at 16 (explaining that because “the First Amendment 
reads ‘Congress shall make no law’ . . . the [Second Amendment] was initially intended to 
be a restriction on Congress, not an individual right” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)). 
 33. See DOHERTY, supra note 25, at 11–13 (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 
Litt.) 90, 91–92 (Ct. App. 1822)). 
 34. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 8 (citing former Chief Justice 
Burger’s rejection of the individual rights theory:  “the NRA’s individual rights 
interpretation of the Second Amendment ‘has been the subject of the greatest pieces of fraud 
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Professor Saul Cornell posits that these categorizations misinterpret 
history and that the original understanding of the Second Amendment was a 
civic right guaranteeing citizens the ability to keep and bear the arms 
necessary “to meet their legal obligation to participate in a well-regulated 
militia.”36  In fact, restoring the Founder’s understanding of the Second 
Amendment would involve intrusive gun regulation that neither individual 
rights nor collective rights theorists would welcome.37 
The majority and dissenters in Heller fervently came to opposite 
conclusions; both sides operated under the premise that their interpretation 
of the amendment was consistent with the original intent of its authors.38  
Justice Scalia adopted the individual rights view that the “protected right is 
that of individual citizens to keep and bear their privately owned weapons,” 
while Justice Stevens’s dissent adopted the collective rights view that the 
“protected right is the right of state governments to maintain military 
organizations.”39 
Scalia’s majority opinion has been hailed as a “triumph of originalism.”40  
He invokes the previously articulated argument in which the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right because “the people” language 
contained in the operative clause appears in other provisions of the 
Constitution that confer individual rights.41  Specifically, the First 
Amendment’s Assembly and Petition Clause42 and the Fourth 
Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause43 both contain the phrase “the 
people” and both “unambiguously refer to individual rights, not collective 
rights.”44  The Second Amendment’s prefatory clause containing this 
language asserts the purpose of the right’s codification—“to prevent 
elimination of the militia.”45  It does not follow, however, that maintaining 
 
. . . on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.’” 
(quoting The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS Television Broadcast Dec. 16, 1991))). 
 35. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 628–29 (2008). 
 36. CORNELL, supra note 19, at 2. 
 37. Id. (referencing mandatory gun registration, inspection of privately owned weapons 
by government officials, requirement that all able citizens purchase personal military-style 
assault weapons, etc.). 
 38. Linda Greenhouse, Sidebar:  3 Defining Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at 
WK4. 
 39. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2009). 
 40. Greenhouse, supra note 38.  Originalism can be defined as the “original 
meaning . . . of the constitutional text [that] is fixed at the time each provision is framed and 
ratified.” Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 453, 456 (2013).  Judges “ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they 
engage in constitutional practice.” Id. 
 41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 579 (2008). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”). 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. 
 45. Id. at 599. 
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the militia was the only reason Americans valued the right to bear arms.46  
Rather, Justice Scalia’s opinion indicates that the prefatory clause confirms 
and supports the operative clause,47 which “guarantee[s] the individual right 
to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”48 
Heller instructs that to discern a right’s original meaning, “we are guided 
by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning.’”49  The Court clarified that, at the 
time of the founding, to “bear” meant to “carry,” not in the ordinary sense 
of conveying or transporting an object but to “carry[] for a particular 
purpose—confrontation.”50  Several constitutional treatises circulated at the 
time of Second Amendment ratification support this “commonsense” 
reading of “bear Arms.”51  William Blackstone noted that the “right of 
having and using arms for self-preservation and defence” was rooted in “the 
natural right of resistance and self-preservation.”52  St. George Tucker, a 
law professor and former Anti-Federalist, echoed Blackstone, insisting that 
the right to “armed self-defense . . . is the ‘first law of nature,’ and any law 
‘prohibiting any person from bearing arms’ crossed the constitutional 
line.”53  The Court’s holding that the Second Amendment confers a 
personal right to bear arms led to the finding that citizens may possess 
firearms in the home for self-defense; this decision is consistent with the 
traditionally understood “home-as-castle” theory.54 
Stripped to its mere essentials, Justice Scalia’s argument can be 
summarized as:  the operative clause (“the right of the people”) of the 
Second Amendment implies a private right in the same way as it does in the 
First and Fourth Amendments.55  Because the other words used in this 
operative clause (“keep and bear Arms”) were also used in nonmilitary 
contexts and established well before the Bill of Rights, the operative clause 
 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Weissman, supra note 23, at 3492–93 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598). 
 48. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
 49. Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 
731 (1931)). 
 50. Id. at 584; see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 51. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Heller, 
554 U.S. at 582–83, 592–93). 
 52. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144. 
 53. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1154 (quoting ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
289 (1803)). 
 54. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting).  
The home-as-castle theory is a metaphor in which “irrespective of actual size or 
composition, a person’s residence is considered a fortress that promotes defense against 
violent injury.” Mark R. Hinkston, Home Safe Home:  Wisconsin’s Castle Doctrine and 
Trespasser Liability Laws, 86 WIS. LAW. 18, 20 (2013).  This longstanding tradition dates as 
far back as Blackstone:  the law “has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a 
man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.” 
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223. 
 55. See Lund, supra note 39, at 1348. 
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does not restrict the Second Amendment to military purposes.56  In 
addition, the prefatory clause (“[a] well regulated militia”) merely explains 
why the preexisting right was codified in the Constitution and did not 
change the nature of the right to be exclusively militia-related.57 
However, many have critiqued Justice Scalia’s opinion, stating that, in 
fact, his decision centers on the modern understanding of the Second 
Amendment, i.e., the “living Constitution.”58  Ironically, Justice Scalia 
acknowledges that interpretation of a living Constitution “allows the 
personal value choices of the judge to decide the case and diminishes 
respect for the Court.”59  Some go so far as to say that “Heller should be 
seen as an embarrassment for those who joined the majority opinion.”60  
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit branded Scalia’s opinion as “faux 
originalism.”61  He further asserts that a purely originalist analysis would 
have reached the opposite result—that the Second Amendment was largely 
concerned with preserving the militia.62  Some members of the judiciary 
believe that the historical evidence on both sides of the debate was equally 
compelling, so the Court should have deferred to the legislature.63 
Some historians have found Justice Stevens’s dissent more persuasive.64  
Justice Stevens’s dissent can be summarized as:  the term “bear arms” in the 
operative clause strongly suggests a military purpose and does not, as the 
majority purports, imply a private right for self-defense.65  The prefatory 
clause specifying the need to maintain a “well-regulated militia” as well as 
the legislative history confirm the exclusive military purpose of the Second 
Amendment.66 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 16 (“Scalia embraced a theory of the 
living Constitution but dressed it up in originalist clothing.”); Winkler, supra note 15, at 
1552–53, 1560–61; see also Pauline Maier, Op-Ed., Justice Breyer’s Sharp Aim, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A31. 
 59. Winkler, supra note 15, at 1558 (citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854–55, 863–64 (1989)). 
 60. Lund, supra note 39, at 1345. 
 61. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness:  The Supreme Court and Gun 
Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 
VA. L. REV. 253, 266–67 (2009).  The concept of legislative deference is founded on the idea 
that the legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to make “sensitive public policy 
judgments.” Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations 
omitted) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)).  As such, a 
court’s role is only “to assure that, in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 666). 
But see infra note 215 (discussing the unreliability of evidence regarding firearm regulation). 
 64. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 12. But see Nicholas J. Johnson, 
Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering, and the Incoherence of Justice 
Stevens’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012) (critiquing Justice Stevens’s 
dissent). 
 65. See Lund, supra note 39, at 1348–49. 
 66. Id. at 1349. 
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Some question whether the Supreme Court’s holding could have been 
decided any other way, given that a significant portion of the country 
overwhelmingly believes that the Constitution guarantees an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms.67  The Ninth Circuit noted that Heller validated 
the Second Amendment’s original meaning in two respects:  (1) the right to 
keep and bear arms is, “and has always been,” an individual right, and 
(2) that this right is oriented to self-defense.68  The Heller decision did 
recognize, however, that the “right secured by the Second Amendment 
[was] not unlimited” and listed examples of “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures” that restrict possession of firearms under certain 
circumstances.69 
The Supreme Court’s holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago70 two 
years later was a logical outgrowth of the Heller decision.71  The question 
presented in McDonald was whether a state government must recognize a 
citizen’s Second Amendment right.72  The answer to this inquiry depended 
upon whether the right identified in Heller was “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition” and “fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty.”73  Because self-defense had been recognized as a basic right and 
Heller determined that this right was the central component of the Second 
Amendment guarantee, the McDonald Court determined that both the 
federal government and the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, are 
subject to its restrictions.74 
The Court in Heller and McDonald never intended to clarify Second 
Amendment jurisprudence in its entirety.75  The Court did make clear that 
“Second Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home.”76  
However, Heller left in its wake a considerable degree of uncertainty with 
regard to Second Amendment rights beyond the home.77  Both Heller and 
McDonald dealt specifically with overturning absolute bans on handguns, 
 
 67. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 15, at 1559–60 (opining that the rule of individual 
right is strong precisely because it does not actually exist, and therefore cannot be 
repudiated).  Popular understanding of the Second Amendment (i.e., an individual right to 
bear arms in nonmilitary contexts) is at odds with a longstanding judicial practice of limiting 
the Second Amendment right to military use of guns. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment 
Minimalism:  Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 252, 269–70 (2008). 
 68. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 69. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008) (“[N]othing in 
[this] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
 70. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 71. See Cornell & Kozuskanich, supra note 18, at 19 (“[T]he notion that incorporation 
follows logically from Heller is hard to dispute as a matter of existing legal doctrine.”). 
 72. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1149 (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766–67). 
 73. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
 74. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1149 (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 748–51). 
 75. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). 
 76. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29). 
 77. See United States v. Macsiandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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as opposed to the less restrictive regulations dealing with concealed carry at 
issue in this Note.  The Court left the task of evaluating the constitutionality 
of firearm regulations up to the lower courts. 
B.   History of Concealed Carry Laws 
When evaluating the legitimacy of current regulations that restrict 
citizens’ ability to carry firearms in public, courts often discuss the 
longstanding tradition of states regulating both concealed and open carry in 
public for protection of public safety.78  Concealed carry is the wearing of a 
firearm under clothing or in a pocket, whereas open carry is visibly 
exposing a firearm on a belt holster.  While this Note later analyzes lower 
court decisions related only to concealed carry laws, both forms of carry are 
relevant to the history of firearm regulations. 
Some states prohibited public carry of firearms “on certain occasions and 
in certain locations” as far back as the Founding era.79  This practice in fact 
is a vestige of fourteenth century English law, primarily drawn from the 
1328 Statute of Northampton which states in relevant part that “no man 
could ‘go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, markets, nor in the 
presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.’”80  
This statute essentially prohibited being armed in public, regardless of 
whether the arms were visible or concealed.81  Leading scholars influential 
during the Founding era relied on the Statute of Northampton when 
discussing criminal offenses, and states such as Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, and Virginia incorporated this statute into their own laws in the 
years following the Constitution’s adoption.82  For example, North 
Carolina’s statute nearly quoted the Statute of Northampton, prohibiting the 
carry of arms during the day and night “in fairs, markets, [and] in the 
presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, [and] in no part 
elsewhere.”83 
The early nineteenth century saw an increase in the individualist identity, 
with a rise in the number of individuals carrying weapons for self-
defense.84  One journalist attributed the increase of concealed weapons to 
the Jacksonian, Anti-Federalist political doctrine that fueled “extravagant 
 
 78. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 84–85, 95–96, 97; see also Saul Cornell & Nathan 
DeDino, A Well Regulated Right:  The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 502–16 (2004). 
 79. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 95 (citing Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second 
Amendment Outside the Home:  History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2012)). 
 80. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 944 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328)). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id.; Charles, supra note 79, at 31–32. 
 83. See Charles, supra note 79, at 32 (citing FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION 
OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 
61 (Newbern 1792)). 
 84. See CORNELL, supra note 19, at 137. 
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notions of ‘personal rights and personal independence.’”85  This rise in 
individualism spawned fears that handguns posed a threat to society, so 
legislatures enacted the first comprehensive laws limiting handguns and 
concealed weapons.86  The first state to have adopted a concealed weapon 
statute was Kentucky in 1813, with Louisiana, Indiana, Georgia, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and Alabama following soon thereafter.87  During this time, laws 
regulating the use of firearms in public “became commonplace and far more 
expansive in scope than regulations during the Founding Era.”88  For 
example, Georgia “criminalized the sale of concealable weapons, 
effectively moving toward their complete prohibition.”89  Virginia’s ban on 
concealed carry “explicitly rejected a self-defense exception.”90 
These restrictions quickly prompted backlash, producing the “first 
systematic defense of an individual right to bear arms in self-defense.”91  
The first court to consider the issue of concealed carry regulations held that 
restrictions on an individual’s right to keep and bear arms were 
unconstitutional.92  The highest court in Kentucky invalidated restrictions 
on carrying concealed weapons.93  However, most nineteenth-century 
courts found comprehensive restrictions on firearms in public to be 
constitutional.94 
Some nineteenth-century state courts found that a state may regulate open 
carry or concealed carry of handguns but not both.  The Supreme Court of 
Alabama in State v. Reid95 upheld a prohibition on concealed carrying of 
“any species of fire arms” but noted that the state’s regulation of firearms 
could not “amount[] to a destruction of the right” to bear arms by also 
banning open carry.96  Relying on this finding, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia found that the prohibition on carrying concealed pistols was 
unconstitutional because the statute “contain[ed] a prohibition against 
bearing arms openly” and therefore amounted to a destruction of the right.97  
Interestingly, at least four states once banned the carrying of firearms in 
 
 85. See id. at 139 (quoting Joseph Gales, Prevention of Crime, in EARLY INDIANA 
TRIALS:  AND SKETCHES 465, 476 (Oliver Hampton Smith ed., 1858)). 
 86. See id. at 4. 
 87. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  
DUELING, SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 2–3 (1999). 
 88. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 95 & n.21 (2d Cir. 2012) (referring 
to twenty nineteenth-century state statutes). 
 89. Id. at 96 (citing Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 90, invalidated by Nunn v. 
State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846)). 
 90. Id. (citing ch. 101, 1838 Va. Acts 76). 
 91. CORNELL, supra note 19, at 138. 
 92. See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 626 (2008); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 
90. 
 95. 1 Ala. 612 (1840). 
 96. Id. at 614, 616. 
 97. Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846). 
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both a concealed and open manner in public,98 and three of these statutes 
survived constitutional challenges.99 
The rise of restrictive gun carrying laws may have been fueled, at least in 
part, by racial motivations.100  These laws were intended to keep guns out 
of the hands of free blacks.101  After the Civil War, significant debate in 
Congress and in public discourse took place over “how to secure 
constitutional rights for newly freed slaves.”102  Statutes limiting privileges 
of constitutional citizenship to newly freed men were largely modeled on 
Mississippi’s 1865 “Act to Regulate the Relation of Master and Apprentice 
Relative to Freedmen, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes,” which stated in part 
that “no freedman, free negro or mulatto . . . shall keep or carry fire-arms of 
any kind, or any ammunition.”103  Notwithstanding racial motivations, 
courts generally upheld restrictive concealed carry laws in order to promote 
public safety.104  Many states in the North did not pass laws regulating the 
concealed carry of weapons until the 1920s.105  In 1897, the Supreme Court 
granted its stamp of approval on concealed carry laws by finding that “the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not infringed by laws 
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”106 
Today, the Ninth Circuit finds that states have the right to “prescribe a 
particular manner of carry” and need not allow both open and concealed 
carry, but states must make provisions to allow at least one of these 
options.107  Providing such wide discretion to the state, however, may in 
 
 98. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 90–91 (citing Law of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, §§ 1–2, 1881 
Ark. Acts 191–92; Law of Dec. 2, 1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Terr. Comp. Laws 352; Act 
to Preserve the Peace and Prevent Homicide, ch. 13, § 1, 1870 Tenn. Acts 28; Act to 
Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons, Law of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 
1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25 (substantially modified by TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.171–
.208 (West 1997)). 
 99. See, e.g., Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165 (1871); 
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871). 
 100. See CRAMER, supra note 87, at 9. 
 101. Id. (noting that the location and timing of the concealed carry restrictions suggest 
that they were intended for “social control of free blacks”). 
 102. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008)). 
 103. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1161–62 (citing Law of Nov. 22, 1865, ch. 23, § 1, 1866 
Miss. Laws. 165).  The act was rigorously enforced and led to a “thorough confiscation” of 
black-owned guns, “whether found at home or on the person.” Id. at 1162 (citing HARPER’S 
WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 1866, at 19, col. 2). 
 104. See, e.g., City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 621 (Kan. 1905) (upholding statute); 
Fife, 31 Ark. at 461 (upholding statute); Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (upholding 
statute); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 161–62 (1840) (upholding statute); see 
also Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard:  Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 
70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1135 n.43 (2011) (citing State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 11 (W. Va. 
1891) (“The presumption which the law establishes, that every man who goes armed in the 
midst of a peaceable community is of vile character . . . is in consonance with the common 
law, and is a perfectly just and proper presumption.”)). 
 105. See CRAMER, supra note 87, at 4. 
 106. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897). 
 107. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172 (noting that the state has freedom to decide its 
regulatory scheme, “provided that it does not ‘cut[] off the exercise of the right of the citizen 
altogether to bear arms, or, under the color of prescribing the mode, render[] the right itself 
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fact follow from an unfaithful reading of Heller; according to a recent 
article, the historical sources consulted by the Supreme Court in Heller 
unequivocally indicate that the Second Amendment protects only open 
carry of weapons.108  On the other hand, open carry may not be in line with 
today’s custom because many believe open carry incites fear and may 
create undue panic.109 
Some courts use this rich history of regulating firearms in public to 
demonstrate that regulation of concealed carry is a valid state practice 
because “states have long recognized a countervailing and competing set of 
concerns with regard to handgun ownership and use in public.”110 
C.   Current State Restrictions on Carrying Concealed Firearms 
States greatly differ over the requisite conditions and circumstances 
under which citizens may carry a firearm on their person in public.  Some 
states require a permit to lawfully carry a gun while others allow open or 
concealed carry of handguns without a permit.111  In addition, state statutes 
vary as to where a handgun may be legally carried.112 
States also differ in the amount of discretion given to officials who issue 
carry permits.113  The level of discretion is different for “shall-issue” versus 
 
useless.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 243)); see also Drake v. Filko, 724 
F.3d 426, 449 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough a State may prohibit 
the open or concealed carry of firearms, it may not ban both because a complete prohibition 
on public carry violates the Second Amendment.”).  While only the Ninth Circuit has 
explicitly stated this, scholars and prominent gun rights lawyers agree. See Meltzer, supra 
note 16, at 1525. 
 108. See Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1490. 
 109. See id.  While Meltzer notes that open carry may not “jibe with modern 
sensibilities,” he ultimately believes that “because the Court has committed to an originalist 
methodology for the Second Amendment, complaints about open carry’s [inconsistency] 
with modern practice ought to have very little sway.” Id. at 1490–91.  Meltzer believes open 
carry must be accepted as a consequence of the Court’s method of interpretation. Id. at 
1518–19, 1522.  Common law tradition (such as North Carolina’s common law rule named 
“Going Armed to the Terror of the People”) does in fact indicate that open carry may be 
limited because of the terror it incites. See Symposium, Panel Two:  Aligning the Sights:  A 
Practical Discussion on the Accuracy and Clarity of Gun Control, 5 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 247 
(2014). 
 110. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).  For further 
discussion of the Second Amendment’s scope, see Part II.D.1. 
 111. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West Supp. 2014) (requiring a state-issued 
permit to lawfully carry a gun), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3102, 13-3112 (Supp. 
2013) (allowing open or concealed carry of handguns without a permit but also making 
available an optional permit). 
 112. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(N)(8) (Supp. 2014) (prohibiting permit 
holders from carrying firearms in places of worship), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3102(A)(11) (prohibiting permit holders from carrying firearms in polling places), with 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1277(A)(4) (West Supp. 2014) (prohibiting permit holders from 
carrying firearms at professional sporting events). 
 113. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b(7) (West 2012) (stating that county 
concealed weapons licensing boards “shall issue” a carry permit to all applicants who meet 
stated requirements), with MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) 
(granting local officials broad discretion to issue permits only to individuals they deem 
“suitable”). 
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“may-issue” states.  In shall-issue states, a licensing agent must issue a 
permit to an individual who satisfies the requirements articulated in the 
state’s statute.114  As of July 2014, thirty-seven states have shall-issue 
concealed carry laws.115  In may-issue states, individuals are required to 
obtain a concealed carry permit; however, the licensing agent has wide 
discretion to deny a permit even if the applicant meets all the requisite 
criteria.116  For example, one discretionary determination is that “the 
authority believes the applicant lacks good character or lacks a good reason 
for carrying a weapon in public.”117  As of July 2014, nine states use may-
issue concealed carry laws.118  Only four states allow citizens to carry a 
concealed weapon without obtaining a permit or license.119  All of the 
statutes discussed in Part IV of this Note, except for Illinois’s, qualify as 
may-issue laws.120 
State concealed carry laws exist on a spectrum from more restrictive to 
less restrictive.121  State legislatures impose certain standards more 
frequently than others—eleven states require applicants to demonstrate a 
particularized need or a proper purpose as to why the applicant needs a 
permit, eight states require that the applicant be of good character, and 
about half of all states require an applicant to demonstrate a knowledge of 
firearm use and safety.122 
Of relevance for this Note are the requirements from the eleven states 
that place a heightened burden on applicants to demonstrate a unique reason 
 
 114. See Steven W. Kranz, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes:  Can Small 
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 649 (2006). 
 115. See Concealed Weapons Laws in America from 1981 to Today, LAW CTR. TO 
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ccw-
factsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Concealed Weapons] (including all 
states not mentioned infra note 118 and note 119).  In seventeen of these thirty-seven states, 
the issuing authority has no discretion to deny a permit to a person who meets these 
requirements, but in the other twenty states, authorities have some discretion, such as having 
a “reasonable suspicion to believe that the applicant is a danger to self or others.” LAW CTR. 
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA:  A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 
OF GUN LAWS NATIONWIDE 218 (2014).  This latter group of states falls between the pure 
shall-issue and pure may-issue states.  See id. 
 116. Sarah Steers, Survey of State Open and Concealed Carry Laws, JURIST (July 17, 
2014, 11:02 PM), http://jurist.org/feature/2014/07/survey-of-state-firearms-laws---dnp.php. 
 117. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 115, at 216. 
 118. See Concealed Weapons, supra note 115 (including Hawaii, California, New York, 
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island). 
 119. See id. (including Alaska, Arizona, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
 120. See infra notes 124, 131–32, 136, 138, 144.  Illinois’s statute amounted to a 
wholesale ban on carrying concealed weapons rather than a set of application criteria. 
 121. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112 (Supp. 2013) (allowing concealed carry 
permits to U.S. citizens above the age of twenty-one who have not been convicted of a 
felony or qualify as mentally ill and who demonstrate proficiency with firearms), with N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 2005), § 2C:58-3(c) (West Supp. 2014) (requiring applicant to 
demonstrate good character, a justifiable need, no prior history of crime, no dependence on 
drugs or alcohol, the issuance of such a permit would not be contrary to public health or 
safety, etc.). 
 122. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 115, at 218–20. 
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why they are entitled to a concealed carry permit.123  The exact 
requirement, whether demonstrating a “justifiable need” or a “proper 
cause,” depends upon the particular state’s statutory language.  Part III of 
this Note analyzes five challenges to the constitutionality of these state 
regulations.  The state statutes in effect at the time of the respective 
challenges are summarized below. 
New York’s concealed carry permit law provided:  “A license for a pistol 
or revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be issued 
to . . . (f) have and carry concealed, without regard to employment or place 
of possession, by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance 
thereof.”124  Under New York law, an individual was entitled to a concealed 
carry permit, notwithstanding a showing of proper cause, through 
employment or place of possession.125  In the context of concealed carry for 
self-defense, as opposed to for target practice or hunting, New York courts 
defined “proper cause” as a “special need for self-protection distinguishable 
from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same 
profession.”126  Proper cause was not satisfied by establishing a 
“generalized desire to carry a concealed weapon,”127 or by simply living or 
being employed in a high-crime neighborhood.128  Further, licensing 
officers had considerable discretion in determining whether proper cause 
existed, and this licensing decision was upheld unless found arbitrary and 
capricious.129  Additional, less controversial requirements included that the 
applicant be over the age of twenty-one, have good moral character, and not 
have a history of crime or mental illness.130 
Maryland law required that the issuing party first find that the applicant 
did not have a disqualifying criminal record, alcohol or drug addiction, or 
propensity for violence before issuing a concealed carry permit.131  In 
addition, the applicant had to establish a “good and substantial reason to 
wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is 
necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”132  A 
Handgun Permit Unit determined “whether the applicant’s reasons for 
seeking a permit ‘[were] good and substantial,’ whether ‘the applicant [had] 
any alternative available to him for protection other than a handgun permit,’ 
and whether ‘the permit [was] necessary as a reasonable precaution for the 
 
 123. These states include:  California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Indiana, New Hampshire, and North Dakota. See id. at 
218–19. 
 124. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2008) (emphasis added) (current 
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 2014)). 
 125. See id. § 400.00(2)(a)–(e). 
 126. Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 256 (App. Div. 1980). 
 127. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
 128. Martinek v. Kerik, 743 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (App. Div. 2002). 
 129. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 87. 
 130. See id. at 86 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(a)–(d), (g)). 
 131. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 869 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(1)–(5)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., 
PUB. SAFETY § 5-306 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013))). 
 132. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (emphasis added)). 
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applicant against apprehended danger.’”133  The existence of an 
apprehended danger to the applicant was an objective inquiry but could not 
be established by a “vague threat” or a general fear of “liv[ing] in a 
dangerous society.”134  However, failure to meet the apprehended threat 
criterion did not automatically preclude an applicant from obtaining a 
concealed carry permit; the Permit Unit also considered factors such as 
(1) the “nearness” or likelihood of a threat or presumed threat; 
(2) whether the threat can be verified; (3) whether the threat is particular 
to the applicant . . . ; (4) if the threat can be presumed to exist, what is the 
basis for the presumption; and (5) the length of time since the initial threat 
occurred.135 
New Jersey’s permit law stated that the permitting authority shall not 
approve a permit application unless the applicant is “not subject to any of 
the disabilities set forth in 2C:58-3c [which includes criminal history, age, 
and mental health requirements], that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe 
handling and use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a 
handgun.”136  Justifiable need was defined as “the urgent necessity for self-
protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which 
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided 
by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”137 
California’s statutory requirement for obtaining a permit to carry a 
concealed weapon stated that the issuing authority may issue a permit to an 
applicant upon his showing that:  “(1) The applicant is of good moral 
character.  (2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license.  (3) The 
applicant is a resident of the county or a city within the county . . . .  (4) The 
applicant has completed a course of training.”138 
Each licensing authority (i.e., the county sheriff or municipal police 
department) had to publish a written policy that provided its own definition 
of “good cause.”139  San Diego County’s good cause requirement was 
similar to New York’s, defining “good cause” as “[a] set of circumstances 
that distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to 
be placed in harm’s way.”140  Exceptions were made for particular classes 
of people or in particular situations.141  California courts have 
 
 133. Id. (citation omitted). 
 134. Id. at 870 (alteration in original) (quoting Scherr v. Handgun Permit Review Bd., 
880 A.2d 1137, 1148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
 137. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54-2.4(d)(1) (Supp. 2011). 
 138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150 (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
 139. See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment As a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
223, 223 n.3 (2014) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26160, 26202 (West 2012)).  San Diego’s 
interpretation of “good cause” was found unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit. See infra 
Part III.C.1. 
 140. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
 141. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25450 (West Supp. 2014) (peace officers), § 25455 
(retired peace officers), § 25620 (military personnel), § 25650 (retired federal officers), 
§ 26035 (on private property or place of business), § 26040 (where hunting is allowed), 
§ 26045 (when faced with “immediate, grave danger” in the “brief interval before and after 
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acknowledged that good cause may arise in situations related to personal 
safety, as well as situations relevant for business or occupations; however, 
concern for personal safety alone did not suffice.142 
Illinois’s law amounted to a wholesale ban on carrying firearms in 
public, similar to D.C.’s ban in Heller.143  The Illinois statute forbade a 
person from carrying a firearm in any location other than his home or 
business, or in the home of another when invited, unless the firearm was 
“broken down in a non-functioning state; or [was] not immediately 
accessible; or [was] unloaded and enclosed in a case.”144  This sweeping 
requirement was found unconstitutional,145 and the Illinois legislature has 
since enacted a new concealed carry law that allows people to carry 
concealed weapons with a license.146  This licensing scheme does not have 
a heightened permit requirement similar to the “justifiable need,” “proper 
cause,” or “good and substantial reason” language found in the New Jersey, 
New York, and Maryland statutes, respectively.  Rather, an applicant for a 
concealed carry permit must possess a Firearm Owner’s Identification 
(FOID) card,147 submit to a background check, not be a convicted felon, not 
have a violent misdemeanor within the past five years, and not have two or 
more violations for driving while under the influence.148 
D.   Defining the Two-Prong Marzzarella Test 
After the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Heller establishing 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms for 
self-defense, courts were faced with a flood of challenges to other firearm 
regulations.149  In the wake of this chaos, the Third Circuit in United States 
v. Marzzarella150 articulated a two-prong test to evaluate Second 
Amendment challenges:  (1) “whether the challenged law imposes a burden 
on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment” and (2) if 
so, whether the law survives under some form of means-end scrutiny.151  If 
 
the local law enforcement agency . . . has been notified of the danger and before the arrival 
of its assistance”), § 26050 (attempting to make a lawful arrest). 
 142. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1148. 
 143. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 144. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4)(i)–(iii) (West Supp. 2010), invalidated by 
Moore, 702 F.3d at 933. 
 145. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 146. See Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/1 (West 2014). 
 147. See id. 65/2, 65/8 (requiring qualifications such as U.S. citizen, over the age of 
twenty-one (or eighteen, with parental consent), not mentally impaired, not addicted to 
controlled substances, etc.). 
 148. See id. 66/30. 
 149. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 887 & n.30 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Heller unleashed a “tsunami of legal uncertainty, and thus litigation” 
and that amicus curiae briefs estimated 190 Second Amendment challenges were brought 
within the first eighteen months after Heller). 
 150. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 151. Id. at 89 (formulating the test in the context of a federal prohibition on firearms with 
obliterated serial numbers); see also Joan H. Miller, The Slow Evolution of Second 
Amendment Law, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA 1, 4 (2014), 
http://seattleuniversitylawreview.com/files/2014/03/MillerArticleUpdateFINAL.pdf (citing 
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the challenged law is not protected by the Second Amendment (i.e., it does 
not fall within the amendment’s scope), then the analysis ends and the law 
is upheld.152  However, if the statute in question does implicate the Second 
Amendment, then the court progresses to the second prong and “balance[s] 
‘the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the 
challenged law burdens the right.’”153  The Marzzarella test can be applied 
to any challenge to a firearm regulation, but this Note is concerned with 
state regulations that restrict an individual’s ability to carry a concealed 
weapon in public. 
II.   THE SCOPE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT BEYOND THE HOME: 
THREE INTERPRETATIONS 
This part summarizes circuit courts’ differing answers to the first prong 
of the Marzzarella test:  whether or not the Second Amendment right 
extends beyond the home.  In other words, does the right to keep and bear 
arms for the purpose of self-defense include the right to carry handguns 
outside of the home?  A circuit split has emerged over this inquiry between 
(1) those that found the scope of the Second Amendment does extend 
beyond the home (the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits),154 (2) those 
that found the Second Amendment does not extend beyond the home (the 
Tenth Circuit),155 and (3) those that explicitly chose to avoid this 
constitutional question by proceeding directly to the second prong of the 
analysis (the Third and Fourth Circuits).156 
A.   Second Amendment Extends Outside of the Home 
Some legal scholars and lower courts agree that Second Amendment 
protection extends beyond the home.  In analyzing challenges to the various 
state statutes restricting public carry, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
affirmatively determined that Second Amendment protection does extend 
beyond the home.157  The Second Circuit did not make such a definitive 
statement, but instead conceded “the Amendment must have some 
application in the very different context of the public possession of 
 
courts that have applied the two-prong test:  Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of 
Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 152. See Miller, supra note 151, at 4 (citing Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at 194). 
 153. Id. (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at 194). 
 154. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore v. Madigan, 
702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 155. See Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1197. 
 156. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 
426 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 157. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1155 (“[T]he right to carry in case of confrontation means 
nothing if not the general right to carry a common weapon outside the home for self-
defense.”); Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (“[O]ne doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a 
right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not 
rationally have been limited to the home.”). 
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firearms.”158  While neither Heller nor McDonald spoke precisely to the 
scope of the Second Amendment right outside of the home, the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits found that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heller “points 
in a general direction.”159 
Michael O’Shea, a professor of constitutional law, believes that judicial 
authority over the past two hundred years illuminates a personal right to 
bear arms for self-defense which necessarily creates a right to carry a 
handgun outside of one’s home.160  Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit 
speculated that “[t]here may or may not be a Second Amendment right in 
some places beyond the home” and the whole issue “strikes [the court] as a 
vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only 
then by small degree.”161  O’Shea, based on his extensive review of state 
case law, asserts that judges who express such a concern ignore substantial 
state precedent supporting the right to carry arms in public.162  Furthermore, 
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit responded to Judge Wilkinson:  “Fair 
enough; but that ‘vast terra incognita’ has been opened to judicial 
exploration by Heller and McDonald.”163 
Four features of Heller and McDonald suggest that the Second 
Amendment does protect individuals’ rights to carry handguns outside of 
the home:  (1) the centrality of self-defense, (2) the definition of “bear 
arms,” (3) the focus on handguns, and (4) the identification of 
“presumptively lawful, longstanding” regulations.  First, individual self-
defense is at the heart of the Second Amendment’s protection.164  In Heller, 
the majority held that the military purpose implied by the prefatory clause 
does not alter the “traditionally understood content of the right” (i.e., self-
defense).165  The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Moore v. Madigan166 
comports with O’Shea’s interpretation that the right to bear arms outside of 
the home underlies the Heller opinion because the Court emphasized self-
defense as the fundamental core of Second Amendment rights.167  The 
Supreme Court recognized that “‘the need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute’ in the home,”168 but Judge Posner extends this 
concept, noting that self-defense is equally important, if not more 
 
 158. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89. 
 159. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700 (7th 
Cir. 2011)). 
 160. Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I):  
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
585, 589 (2012).  O’Shea conducted an extensive review of state case law in which courts 
affirm that the right to bear arms extends outside of the home. See id. at 623–64. 
 161. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 162. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 589–90. 
 163. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 164. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 609. 
 165. Id. at 609–10 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)). 
 166. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 167. See id. at 935–37. 
 168. Id. at 935 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766–67 (2010)). 
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important, outside the home.169  Confining the Second Amendment to the 
home “divorce[s] the Second Amendment from the right of self-
defense.”170 
Second, the Second Amendment protects an individual right to carry a 
concealed firearm in public because of the definition of “bear arms.”171  
The natural meaning of the phrase “bear arms” was to “wear, bear, or carry 
[weapons] upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose 
of . . . being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of 
conflict with another person.”172  Thus, keeping a firearm in one’s home is 
merely a “subset of a right” extending to citizens “who must move among 
other persons in public to live.”173  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits agree 
that because “‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would at all times have 
been an awkward usage,” it implies a right to carry a weapon outside the 
home.174  Further, Judge Hardiman in Drake v. Filko175 stated that “to 
speak of ‘bearing’ arms solely within one’s home . . . would conflate 
‘bearing’ with ‘keeping,’ in derogation of the Court’s holding that the verbs 
codified distinct rights.”176  Judge Posner also articulated a common sense 
reading of the Second Amendment:  allowing a woman who obtained a 
protective order against a violent ex-husband to sleep with a loaded gun 
under her mattress but prohibiting her from carrying a firearm in public 
“creates an arbitrary difference.”177 
Third, the fact that handguns were given particular attention in Heller 
implies that individuals have the right to carry these firearms in public 
pursuant to the Second Amendment.178  The handgun is the “most preferred 
firearm in the nation.”179  Thus, the Court’s strong protection of handgun 
ownership and discussion of this firearm in particular suggests that the 
“defensive role for which handguns are uniquely suited—routine carry 
outside the home”—is protected under the Second Amendment.180 
Fourth, Heller identifies “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” as being 
presumptively lawful regulations.181  The Ninth Circuit notes that “[w]ere 
the right restricted to the home, the constitutional invincibility of such 
 
 169. Id. at 942.  Heller “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in 
case of confrontation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  And “[c]onfrontations are not limited to the 
home.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 936; see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 444 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 170. Moore, 702 F.3d at 937. 
 171. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 609. 
 172. Id. at 613 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 584) (alteration in original). 
 173. Id. (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 174. Moore, 702 F.3d at 936; see also Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1152 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 175. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 176. Id. at 444 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 177. Moore, 702 F.3d at 937. 
 178. See O’Shea, supra note 160, at 609. 
 179. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (quoting Parker v. 
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 180. O’Shea, supra note 160, at 615. 
 181. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
2778 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
restrictions would go without saying.”182  The Ninth Circuit criticized 
courts, such as the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, for failing to 
explicitly recognize a Second Amendment right outside the home by 
“evading an in-depth analysis of history and tradition . . . [and] miss[ing] a 
crucial piece of the Second Amendment analysis.”183 
In sum, the Heller and McDonald decisions gave rise to four compelling 
arguments supporting the idea that the Second Amendment applies to 
firearms in public places. 
B.   Second Amendment Does Not Extend Outside of the Home 
The Tenth Circuit found that the Second Amendment is only applicable 
inside the home because the country has a longstanding practice of banning 
concealed carry of firearms, and the Supreme Court in Heller instructed that 
nothing in its opinion should cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions.184  In 
articulating this position, the court noted Heller and McDonald’s use of 
nineteenth-century cases that approved of such restrictions185 and well-
established statutory restrictions on concealed carry within the United 
States.186 
Some argue that the Second Amendment does not extend beyond the 
home because the laws challenged and struck down by the Supreme Court 
in Heller involved possession of handguns only within the home and did 
not confront the question of concealed carry in public.187  Further, the 
 
 182. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 183. Id. at 1174–75 (discussing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013); 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012)).  Interestingly, the dissent in Moore critiqued 
the Seventh Circuit majority, which also refrained from engaging with history and tradition 
when considering whether the Second Amendment includes a right beyond the home. See 
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting).  Judge 
Williams stated that the court should have repeated the methodology and analysis applied in 
Heller to address the question of firearm possession in public as opposed to the home. Id. at 
943.  The majority believed that the state, in asserting that the Second Amendment right to 
self-defense does not extend to the public, was asking the court to “repudiate Heller’s 
historical analysis.” See id.  However, the dissent points out that Heller did not consider 
whether a preexisting right to carry firearms in public for self-defense existed, and by asking 
the court to make this assessment, the state was in fact “embrac[ing] Heller’s method of 
analysis” by requesting that the court embark on the same analysis but for the different right 
being asserted. Id. 
 184. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 2013).  Some historical 
sources indicate that only open carry, not concealed carry, is protected by the Second 
Amendment. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  In Peterson, a Washington state 
resident applied for a concealed handgun license in Colorado; however, Colorado law states 
that such licenses may only be issued to state residents. See Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1201.  
After being denied the license, the Washington resident brought suit alleging that the 
Colorado statute violated the Second Amendment. See id. 
 185. See Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1210–11 (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–
82 (1897); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 
(1846)). 
 186. See id. at 1211.  For discussion of the history of concealed carry laws, see supra 
notes 78–110 and accompanying text. 
 187. See O’Shea, supra note 160, at 589 (citing People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011)). But see Drake, 724 
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history of the Founding era indicates that there was no right to travel with a 
weapon in public under English law.188  As such, Heller and McDonald 
cannot be invoked to support a finding that the Second Amendment protects 
public carrying of handguns.189 
C.   Silence on Whether the Second Amendment Extends Beyond the Home 
Some lower courts chose to avoid deciding the constitutional issue under 
the first prong of the Marzzarella test and instead proceeded directly to the 
second prong of the analysis.190  These court opinions found that even 
assuming the Second Amendment right extends outside of the home, the 
regulation, for example, a justifiable-need standard for issuing permits, 
survives the second prong inquiry.191  Justifiable-need standards have 
“survived intermediate scrutiny even when the court has punted on the 
question of whether the concealed carry of firearms in public places is 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”192  The Fourth Circuit took 
this approach in Woollard v. Gallagher.193  It noted that other courts have 
“deemed it prudent to instead resolve post-Heller challenges to firearm 
prohibitions at the second step.”194  As such, the Fourth Circuit refrained 
 
F.3d at 445 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“Describing the holding [as encompassing a general 
right to self-defense]—first establishing the legal principle embodied in the Second 
Amendment and then explaining how it was applied—demonstrates that the legal principle 
enunciated in Heller is not confined to the facts presented in that case.”). 
 188. See Saul A. Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich, Appendix A:  The Scholarly Landscape 
Since Heller, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 18, at 393. 
 189. See O’Shea, supra note 160, at 589. 
 190. See, e.g., Drake, 724 F.3d at 430 (“It remains unsettled whether the individual right 
to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home.”); United States v. 
Mahin, 668 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2012); Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 
2012); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (expressing belief 
that this issue is a “vast terra incognita” that courts should enter only upon necessity).  For 
analysis of the second prong of the Marzzarella test, see Part III.B–C. 
 191. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e merely assume 
that the Heller right exists outside the home and that such right of . . . Woollard has been 
infringed.  We are free to make that assumption because the good-and-substantial-reason 
requirement passes constitutional muster under . . . intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 192. Miller, supra note 151, at 5–6 (citing Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876). 
 193. 712 F.3d at 876; see also William Young, Jr., Woollard v. Gallagher:  Normalizing 
the Fourth Circuit’s Approach to Second Amendment Challenges, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 
35, 64 (2014), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1029&context=endnotes (endorsing the Fourth Circuit’s judicial restraint when 
using, in Young’s opinion, the appropriate “measure of deference to legislative judgments”). 
 194. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875; see also Mahin, 668 F.3d at 123 (refraining from 
recognizing Second Amendment protections outside of the home because the court could 
assume that Mahin “engaged in activity which implicates the Second Amendment” and still 
“uphold [his] conviction”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Although we are inclined to 
uphold the challenged federal laws at step one of our analytical framework, in an abundance 
of caution, we proceed to step two.”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“Although the Supreme Court’s cases applying the Second Amendment have 
arisen only in connection with prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home, the 
Court’s analysis suggests . . . that the Amendment must have some application in the very 
different context of the public possession of firearms.  Our analysis proceeds on this 
assumption.”). 
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from determining whether Maryland’s heightened requirement for obtaining 
a handgun permit implicated Second Amendment rights.195  Instead, the 
court was entitled to merely assume that the right identified in Heller 
existed outside of the home because the good-and-substantial reason 
requirement passed constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny.196  
The Second Circuit also determined that the “proper cause requirement falls 
outside the core Second Amendment protections identified in Heller” 
because the “state’s ability to regulate firearms and . . . conduct, is 
qualitatively different in public than in the home.”197 
The Third Circuit upheld New Jersey’s restrictive “justifiable need” 
requirement for obtaining a concealed carry permit.198  The court found that 
this requirement fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment because it 
is a “presumptively lawful” and “longstanding” restriction on firearm 
possession.199  In its analysis through the two-prong test, the court 
“decline[d] to definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for 
the purpose of self-defense extend[ed] beyond the home, the ‘core’ of the 
right as identified by Heller.”200 
In brief, the above circuit courts disagreed on the first prong of the 
Marzzarella test, namely whether the Second Amendment right extends to 
carrying handguns in public.  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits endorsed the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms outside of the home, whereas the 
Tenth Circuit did not.  The Third and Fourth Circuits avoided the question 
entirely, while the Second Circuit merely assumed that the right exists in 
public.  With the exception of the Tenth Circuit, all circuit courts proceeded 
to prong two of the Marzzarella test to determine the constitutionality of the 
statutes. 
III.   CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS 
ON CONCEALED CARRY 
This part begins by identifying the appropriate standard of review for 
challenges to states’ statutory restrictions on concealed carry.  Identifying 
this standard of review is a prerequisite for the analysis under the second 
prong of the Marzzarella test:  whether a given law survives under the 
predetermined level of scrutiny.  It then summarizes a circuit split that has 
developed in the wake of Heller over whether concealed carry laws survive 
under the appropriate level of scrutiny or impermissibly infringe on a 
citizen’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  The Second, 
Third, and Fourth Circuits have found that laws requiring applicants to 
 
 195. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text 
(discussing Maryland’s heightened statutory requirement for obtaining a concealed carry 
permit). 
 196. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; infra Part III.B.2. 
 197. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 94. 
 198. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 199. Id. at 433 (“The ‘justifiable need’ standard fits comfortably within the longstanding 
tradition of regulating the public carrying of weapons for self-defense.”). 
 200. Id. at 431. 
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demonstrate a heightened need for a firearm are constitutional under the 
Second Amendment.201  On the other hand, the Seventh and the Ninth 
Circuits held that state laws limiting an individual’s ability to carry a 
concealed firearm in public, either through heightened permit requirements 
or through what amounts to a flat-out ban, are not constitutional.202 
A.   The Appropriate Standard of Review 
Means-end scrutiny examines the methods (means) chosen to further the 
purposes (ends) that the regulation is designed to serve.203  This method of 
scrutiny evaluates the sufficiency of a governmental body’s justification for 
its law.204  Three levels of means-end scrutiny are available to courts when 
evaluating a regulation that infringes on the Second Amendment:  rational 
basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.205  The level of 
scrutiny applied in a given case is dependent upon “the regulation’s burden 
on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.”206  The more 
fundamental a right is, the higher level of scrutiny must be applied, but “as 
we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, 
because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-
defense,” and a lower level of scrutiny is permissible.207  The Supreme 
Court in Heller instructed that an individual’s right to bear a firearm within 
his home for the purpose of self-defense is fundamental,208 and any 
restriction thus would be subject to a high level of scrutiny.209  However, an 
individual’s right to carry firearms in public, even if one finds that the 
Second Amendment does extend beyond the home, is more limited and 
 
 201. See id.; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 865; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81. 
 202. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore v. Madigan, 
702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 203. See Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988). 
 204. See id. (“If a sufficient justification exists, the action may be permitted despite the 
applicability of the limit.  If the courts find the justification insufficient, . . . the limit . . . is 
unconstitutional.”). 
 205. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 435 (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95–99 
(3d Cir. 2010)); see also id. at 451–61. 
 206. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045–46 (9th 
Cir. 2012)); see also Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (requiring a “strong justification” for regulations imposing a “substantial burden 
upon the core right of self-defense”); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706, 708 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (applying more demanding scrutiny to “severe burdens on the core Second 
Amendment right”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(requiring “strong justification[s]” for “severe burden[s] on the core Second Amendment 
right” (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010))); 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (calibrating the level of scrutiny to the “severity” of the burden 
imposed). 
 207. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470; accord Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state 
regulation of the carrying of firearms in public, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is 
appropriate in this case.”). 
 208. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 209. See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470. 
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would be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny because the state has a 
legitimate interest to promote public safety.210 
Under the least intense standard of review, rational basis review, a court 
presumes the challenged law is valid and determines “only whether the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”211  While Heller 
expressly avoided determining the appropriate standard of review,212 Heller 
did condemn the use of rational basis review for challenges to firearm 
regulations.213 
The most rigorous standard of review, strict scrutiny, demands that the 
regulation be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government 
interest.”214  Under this standard, the government must choose the least 
restrictive means for achieving the state’s purpose.215  Strict scrutiny may 
be triggered if a regulation threatens a right at the core of the Second 
Amendment:  for example, the right of a law-abiding citizen to keep and use 
a handgun in his home.216  In regards to concealed carry, however, courts 
agree that “[i]f the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a handgun 
outside the home for self-defense at all, that right is not part of the core of 
the Amendment.”217  The distinction between self-defense inside versus 
outside the home calls for use of a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny 
when evaluating firearm regulations limiting use outside of the home.218  
As such, strict scrutiny is also an inappropriate standard of review for 
evaluating challenges to concealed carry regulations. 
In between these two standards of scrutiny lies intermediate scrutiny, 
under which the state’s interest must be “more than just legitimate but need 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 
95–96 n.13). 
 212. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (refraining from determining appropriate level of 
scrutiny because the D.C. handgun ban was unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of 
scrutiny . . . applied to enumerated constitutional rights”). 
 213. See id. at 629 n.27. 
 214. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
 215. See id.  Identifying the least restrictive means, however, is challenging because 
individuals staunchly disagree over whether increased gun control reduces danger to society. 
See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:  An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1465–66 (2009).  
Gun control proponents argue that banning guns is the only effective way to prevent crime, 
while gun control opponents argue that firearm restrictions will not prevent crimes because 
those who misuse guns are the individuals who do not comply with the law. See id. at 1465.  
Volokh points out the empirical black hole that surrounds firearm-related statistics by citing 
methodological critiques of many studies that purport to demonstrate a relationship between 
gun control and crime statistics. See id. at 1466.  He further notes that “because of this 
uncertainty,” lower courts’ analyses of gun regulations often turn on how they “evaluate 
empirical claims of likely danger reduction.” Id. at 1467. 
 216. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 217. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 
F. Supp. 2d 813, 834 (D.N.J. 2012)). 
 218. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty. 
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
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not be compelling.”219  Under this standard, the government must put forth 
a “significant, substantial, or important interest,” which has a “reasonable 
fit” to the “challenged law, such that the law does not burden more conduct 
than is reasonably necessary.”220  Such fit must merely be “substantial, ‘not 
perfect.’”221  The state bears the burden of proof; its “justification must be 
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”222  
However, the state may rely on “a wide range of sources, such as legislative 
text and history, empirical evidence, case law, and common sense” to 
satisfy its burden.223  In cases where firearm regulations burden an 
individual’s right to keep and bear arms in public rather than in the home, 
intermediate scrutiny applies.224 
Other courts have rejected this framework and instead employed the 
reasonableness test225 or an undue burden test.226  Professor Eugene Volokh 
suggests that courts, rather than employing one of the previously 
constructed tests, should instead consider four categories of justifications 
for restricting rights:  (1) scope, (2) burden, (3) danger reduction, and 
(4) government as proprietor, and use these to determine the proper scope 
of government authority.227  A group of judges led by Judge Kavanaugh of 
the D.C. Circuit, the dissenting judge in Heller’s appellate court opinion, 
rejected balancing tests and instead relied on the “common use test” 
outlined in Heller.228 
 
 219. Drake, 724 F.3d at 436. 
 220. Id. (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
Intermediate scrutiny is subject to the same weaknesses as strict scrutiny in that empirical 
data necessary to establish a reasonable fit between the challenged law and the government 
interest is severely lacking. See supra note 215. 
 221. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97). 
 222. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 223. United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 224. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93 n.17 (citing cases that all applied intermediate 
scrutiny:  Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–64 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Booker, 644 
F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; 
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 
F.3d 638, 641–41 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. 
v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1317 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (noting it joins the “majority of 
other courts” in concluding that “intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of 
scrutiny”); Miller, supra note 151, at 4 n.19. 
 225. See Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second Amendment, AM. 
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY 6–7 (Oct. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/ 
files/Mehr%20and%20Winkler%20Standardless%20Second%20Amendment.pdf. 
 226. See Kiehl, supra note 104, at 1148 (citing Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 460 (9th 
Cir. 2009); People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 809 n.5 (Ct. App. 2008)). 
 227. Volokh, supra note 215, at 1446–47. 
 228. The common use test establishes the class of weapons protected by the Second 
Amendment; weapons commonly used include handguns, shotguns, and rifles, while 
“dangerous and unusual weapons” such as fully automatic machine guns do not receive 
constitutional protection. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).  See, 
e.g., Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (employing 
an analysis of the text, history, and tradition of the challenged statute and the Second 
Amendment). 
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Of the five circuits discussed in Part III of this Note, the Second, Third, 
and Fourth Circuits chose to adopt the intermediate standard of scrutiny.229  
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits did not explicitly reject intermediate 
scrutiny, but they chose not to apply any particular standard of heightened 
scrutiny.230  The Seventh Circuit decided that degrees of scrutiny were 
irrelevant because the state simply failed to justify “the most restrictive gun 
law of any of the 50 states.”231  The Ninth Circuit wanted to “parallel[] the 
analysis in Heller itself” in which the Court chose not to apply a particular 
level of scrutiny.232 
B.   Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry Are Constitutional 
Of the five circuit courts that considered the constitutionality of 
restrictions on a citizen’s ability to obtain a concealed carry permit, the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits found such restrictions constitutional.  
The state legislatures in each state used different language to implement a 
heightened requirement;233 however, the Second and Fourth Circuits’ 
opinions mirrored each other while the Third Circuit’s decision followed 
different reasoning. 
1.   Second Circuit:  Upholding a Showing of “Proper Cause” 
In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,234 the Second Circuit held that 
New York legislation restricting full-carry concealed-handgun licenses to 
applicants demonstrating “proper cause” was constitutional.235  The Second 
Circuit established that the proper cause requirement was substantially 
related to important governmental interests in public safety and crime 
prevention.236  The court noted that its “role is only to ‘assure that, in 
formulating its judgments, [New York] has drawn reasonable inferences 
based on substantial evidence.’”237 
The Second Circuit provided a mere four-sentence explanation of 
whether there was a reasonable fit between New York’s statute and the 
government interest.238  The court determined that restricting possession in 
 
 229. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 230. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore v. 
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 231. Moore, 702 F.3d at 941. 
 232. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175. 
 233. See supra Part I.C for description of relevant state laws. 
 234. 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 235. Id. at 101 (finding N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2008) constitutional:  
“A license for a pistol or revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be 
issued to . . . (f) have and carry concealed, without regard to employment or place of 
possession, by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance thereof”).  See supra 
notes 124–30 and accompanying text for summary of the New York statute. 
 236. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97. 
 237. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 
(1994)). 
 238. See David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review:  A Tale of Three 
Circuits, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1449 n.89 (2014) (citing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98–99). 
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this manner “is substantially related to New York’s interests in public safety 
and crime prevention.”239  Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, the court 
held that this regulation was not an “arbitrary licensing regime no different 
from limiting handgun possession to every tenth citizen.”240 
The Second Circuit cited New York’s longstanding tradition of 
restricting handgun use to endorse the legislature’s decision to limit firearm 
possession to only those showing proper cause.241  Specifically, “New 
York’s legislative judgment” regarding limiting firearms in public was born 
over one hundred years ago, with the enactment of the Sullivan Law 
identifying “dangers inherent in the carrying of handguns in public.”242  In 
1913, the legislature determined that a legitimate method for guarding 
against these dangers was to restrict handgun possession to only individuals 
showing proper cause, a regulation that still stands today.243 
The court recognized inconsistent results of studies put forth by the 
opposing parties, some showing that increased handgun ownership by 
lawful citizens does not increase crime and others showing that “widespread 
access to handguns in public increases the likelihood that felonies will 
result in death and fundamentally alters the safety and character of public 
spaces.”244  Notwithstanding this conflicting evidence, the court ultimately 
deferred to the legislature’s judgments because “[i]t is the legislature’s job, 
not [the court’s], to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy 
judgments.”245 
2.   Fourth Circuit:  Permitting Proof of a “Good and Substantial Reason” 
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland 
legislation restricting concealed carry permits to applicants demonstrating a 
“good and substantial reason” was constitutional.246  The court split its 
analysis into two primary inquiries.  First, “whether the governmental 
interest asserted by the state constitutes a ‘substantial’ one.”247  Second, 
“whether the good-and-substantial-reason requirement . . . is ‘reasonably 
adapted’ to Maryland’s significant interests.”248  In other words, has the 
 
 239. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See id. at 84–85, 97. 
 242. Id. at 97 (citing Sullivan Law, ch. 195, 1911 N.Y. Laws 442).  However, New York 
began regulating general firearm usage as far back as 1785. See id. at 84 (citing Law of Apr. 
22, 1785, ch. 81, 1785 N.Y. Laws 152; Law of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N.Y. Laws 627). 
 243. Id. at 97 (citing Sullivan Law, ch. 608, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1627–30). 
 244. Id. at 99. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013).  See supra notes 131–
35 and accompanying text for summary of the Maryland statute.  The applicant must 
establish a “good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a 
finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.” 
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 869 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added)). 
 247. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
 248. Id. at 878 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
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state demonstrated a “reasonable fit” between the heightened permit 
requirement and the government interest of protecting public safety?249 
The court first tackled whether the governmental interest constituted a 
substantial one.250  Maryland’s legislature explained that the permitting 
requirements were meant to serve the state’s interest in “protecting public 
safety and preventing crime.”251  When enacting the good-and-substantial-
reason requirement, the legislature codified its findings that: 
(1) the number of violent crimes committed in the State has increased 
alarmingly in recent years; (2) a high percentage of violent crimes 
committed in the State involves the use of handguns; (3) the result is a 
substantial increase in the number of deaths and injuries largely traceable 
to the carrying of handguns in public places by criminals; (4) current law 
has not been effective in curbing the more frequent use of handguns in 
committing crime; and (5) additional regulations on the wearing, carrying, 
and transporting of handguns are necessary to preserve the peace and 
tranquility of the State and to protect the rights and liberties of the 
public.252 
This includes the finding that in 2009, Maryland had the “eighth highest 
violent crime rate, the third highest homicide rate, and the second highest 
robbery rate of any state.”253  In that same year, 97.4 percent of all 
homicides involving firearms were committed with handguns, and 83.5 
percent of law enforcement officers who died in the line of duty died as a 
result of “intentional gunfire, usually from a handgun.”254  Given these 
findings, the court noted that it could understand the state’s “impetus to 
enact measures aimed at protecting public safety and preventing crime” and 
that such goals constitute a “substantial governmental interest.”255 
Next, the court found that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement 
was substantially related to these government interests.  The requirement 
ensures “access to handgun permits for those who need them while 
preventing a greater-than-necessary proliferation of handguns in public 
places.”256  The good-and-substantial-reason requirement reduces the 
prevalence of handguns in public,257 but it still allows “persons in palpable 
 
 249. Id. (citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 683).  See supra notes 219–24 and accompanying 
text for an overview of intermediate scrutiny. 
 250. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
 251. Id. 
 252. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-202 (LexisNexis 2002). 
 253. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 877 (quotations omitted). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id.; see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) 
(referring to the “significant governmental interest in public safety”); United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (characterizing “the Government’s general interest in 
preventing crime” as “compelling”); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 
2012) (relying on Schenck and Salerno in holding that “reducing domestic gun violence is a 
substantial governmental objective”). 
 256. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880. 
 257. Id. at 879. 
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need of self-protection [to] arm themselves in public places where 
Maryland’s various permit exceptions do not apply.”258 
In view of the legislature’s deliberations related to the concealed carry 
statute, the court elected to defer to the legislature.259  Relying on a 
combination of legislative findings, testimony, and legislative deference, 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland’s statute survived intermediate 
scrutiny.260  Although the court assumed the heightened requirement 
burdened the plaintiff’s Second Amendment right, such burden was 
constitutionally permissible; under intermediate scrutiny, the state had 
sufficiently demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement 
was “reasonably adapted” to the state’s interest in public safety and 
preventing crime.261 
3.   Third Circuit:  Sustaining a “Justifiable Need” Requirement 
In Drake v. Filko, the Third Circuit found that New Jersey legislation 
restricting concealed carry permits to applicants demonstrating a “justifiable 
need” was constitutional.262  The Third Circuit’s conclusion differed from 
both the Second and Fourth Circuit’s conclusions discussed above in that 
the court found that New Jersey’s permitting requirement “qualifies as a 
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation,”263 which Heller identified 
as a separate category of handgun restrictions.264  This decision was 
reached without proceeding through the two-prong test; however, given the 
“important constitutional issues presented,” the court still decided to 
evaluate whether the justifiable need standard survived the intermediate 
level of scrutiny.265  Ultimately, the court found that even if the heightened 
requirement did not qualify as a presumptively lawful, longstanding 
regulation, the justifiable need standard would still pass intermediate 
scrutiny and stand as constitutional.266 
The court’s dual analysis began by determining that the state’s 
heightened requirement qualifies as a presumptively lawful regulation.  The 
Third Circuit had previously established that certain “longstanding 
regulations are ‘exceptions’ to the right to keep and bear arms, such that the 
conduct they regulate is not within the scope of the Second 
 
 258. Id. at 880.  Maryland’s permit exceptions allowed individuals to wear, carry, or 
transport handguns in his own home or personal business property, as well as some public 
locations. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
 259. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 
99 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 260. See Young, supra note 193, at 62. 
 261. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882. 
 262. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013).  See supra notes 136–37 and 
accompanying text for a summary of the New Jersey statute. 
 263. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 264. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 265. Drake, 724 F.3d at 430. 
 266. See id. 
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Amendment.”267  Heller noted that its opinion should not be taken “to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings,” and that these identified 
regulations are not an exhaustive list.268  The Court did not, however, 
provide guidance on how to determine what qualifies as a presumptively 
lawful regulation.269 
The court previously had warned “prudence counsels caution when 
extending [the] recognized [Heller] exceptions to novel regulations 
unmentioned in Heller.”270  However, the court in Drake nevertheless 
determined that New Jersey’s justifiable need requirement qualifies as a 
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation under Heller.271  The court 
looked to the historical roots of the justifiable need standard to qualify it as 
presumptively lawful, as the standard had existed in some form for nearly 
ninety years.272  Since 1924, New Jersey “directed that no persons (other 
than those specifically exempted such as police officers and the like) shall 
carry [concealed] handguns except pursuant to permits issuable only on a 
showing of need.”273  Although the permit law underwent multiple 
revisions, the requirement of demonstrating “need” was present in every 
version; the present-day “justifiable-need” standard “became statutorily 
enshrined” in 1978.274  This heightened need requirement “fits comfortably 
within the longstanding tradition of regulating the public carrying of 
weapons for self-defense.”275 
While all the exceptions named in Heller “derived from historical 
regulations,” the court found that such “pre-ratification presence” is not a 
prerequisite for a statute to qualify as a categorical exception to the Second 
Amendment.276  The court drew an analogy between New Jersey and New 
York’s concealed carry statute.277  In New York, the statute was “adopted 
in the same era that states began adopting the felon in possession statutes 
that Heller explicitly recognized as being presumptively lawful 
longstanding regulations.”278  In fact, the Supreme Court “considered 
 
 267. Id. at 431 (citing United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012); United 
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 269. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 432. 
 270. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93. 
 271. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 432. 
 272. See id. (citing Siccardi v. State, 284 A.2d 533, 538 (N.J. 1971)). 
 273. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Siccardi, 284 A.2d at 538). 
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 275. Id. at 433 (noting that the New Jersey standard is in fact less restrictive than 
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 276. Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010)) 
(preempting criticism that all “presumptively lawful” regulations found in Heller had a 
longstanding historical presence, and thus in order for a restriction to fall within this 
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 277. See id. at 433. 
 278. Id. (quoting Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 830–31 (D.N.J. 2012)).  The 
court is inferring that because the New Jersey statute has been established equally as long as 
2015] A FIVE-CIRCUIT SHOOT-OUT 2789 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons to be longstanding 
although states did not start to enact them until the early 20th century.”279  
For a statute to be considered presumptively lawful, the court concluded 
that a regulation requiring a “particularized showing of objective 
justification to carry a handgun” need not have existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights.280 
The dissent fervently disagreed with the majority’s determination that the 
justifiable need requirement qualifies as a presumptively lawful 
regulation.281  Judge Hardiman noted that the court’s hesitancy in 
recognizing such longstanding regulations was legitimate, as it creates a 
bold precedent in which the judiciary is determining that a “certain 
regulation is completely outside the reach of the Second Amendment, not 
merely that the regulation is a permissible burden on the Second 
Amendment right.”282  Equally dangerous, the majority conducted its 
“longstandingness analysis” at “too high a level of generality.”283  The 
majority chose laws that generally have regulated the public carry of 
firearms as its reference point, when the court should have considered 
whether a longstanding tradition exists of “condition[ing] the issuance of 
permits on a showing of a greater need for self-defense.”284 
In response to the majority’s defense that pre-ratification presence is not 
a prerequisite to categorizing a regulation as presumptively lawful, the 
dissent noted “[a]lthough ‘a regulation can be deemed ‘longstanding’ even 
if it cannot boast a precise founding-era analogue,’ Heller requires, at a 
minimum, that a regulation be rooted in history.”285  The dissent further 
noted that regulations without a “clear historical pedigree” have not been 
found by courts to fit within this “longstandingness” exception.286  If such 
regulations are upheld as constitutional, it is because the statute survived 
 
the New York statute, and the New York statute was created around the same time as other 
laws Heller recognized as presumptively lawful, then New Jersey’s statute has been 
established long enough such that pre-ratification presence should not preclude its status as a 
longstanding regulation. 
 279. Id. at 433–34 (quoting Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quotations 
omitted). 
 280. Id. at 434. 
 281. See id. at 447–51 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 282. Id. at 447. 
 283. Id. at 451. 
 284. Id. (emphasis added). 
 285. Id. at 450 (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
 286. Id. at 447 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to 
recognize as longstanding a multitude of District of Columbia handgun registration 
requirements, including laws requiring re-registration after three years and requiring 
applicants to demonstrate knowledge about firearms, be fingerprinted and photographed, 
take firearms training or safety courses, meet a vision requirement, and submit to a 
background check); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining to 
recognize as longstanding a law prohibiting firearm possession by domestic violence 
misdemeanants because historical data were inconclusive)). 
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constitutional scrutiny, not because it was categorized as presumptively 
lawful.287 
The majority did, however, continue its analysis in the event the 
heightened requirement was not in fact presumptively lawful.288  The State 
of New Jersey “undoubtedly” has a “significant, substantial and important 
interest” in ensuring public safety.289  Therefore, the court framed its 
inquiry as “whether there is a ‘reasonable fit’ between this interest in safety 
and the means chosen by New Jersey to achieve it:  the Handgun Permit 
Law and its ‘justifiable need’ standard.”290  The court conceded that the 
state failed to present the court with evidence to show why or how the 
legislators arrived at their judgment.291  However, the court stated that 
“New Jersey’s inability to muster legislative history indicating what reports, 
statistical information, and other studies its legislature pondered . . . is 
unsurprising.”292  When New Jersey enacted its concealed carry statute, 
Heller had not yet found that the Second Amendment protected an 
individual right to bear arms, so the legislature “could not have foreseen 
that restrictions on carrying a firearm outside the home could run afoul” of 
this amendment.293  The court “refuse[d] to hold that the fit here is not 
reasonable” simply because the state was unable to present data or statistics 
upon which it based its decision.294  Rather than relying on evidence, the 
legislature made “reasonable inference[s]” in light of the lethal nature of 
handguns and felt that requiring an applicant to demonstrate a 
“particularized need for a permit” legitimately serves the state’s interest.295  
The legislature made no attempt to defend the statute, but instead “made a 
policy judgment” that the justifiable need requirement burdened Second 
Amendment rights no more than was “reasonably necessary” to ensure 
public safety.296  The Third Circuit in effect “excuse[d] the state from 
putting forth evidence to support the legislature’s judgment” and afforded 
the New Jersey legislature substantial deference.297 
The dissent again disparaged both the substance and form of the 
majority’s analysis.298  First, the state bears the burden of “justifying its 
restrictions” and therefore must “affirmatively establish the reasonable fit 
[the court] require[s].”299  The court should only consider the reason offered 
by the state, which was merely that “the justifiable need requirement is 
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designed to combat the dangers and risks associated with the misuse and 
accidental use of handguns.”300  New Jersey presented no support for “how 
or why its interest in preventing [abuse] of handguns is furthered by 
limiting possession to those who can show a greater need for self-defense 
than the typical citizen.”301  Unable to present “any study, empirical data, or 
legislative findings,” the state argued that “the fit [i]s a matter of common 
sense.”302  The majority in effect had applied rational basis review, a 
standard rejected by the Court in Heller, under the guise of intermediate 
scrutiny.303  Put bluntly, “The majority err[ed] in absolving New Jersey of 
its obligation to show fit,” because it is the court’s duty “to evaluate the 
State’s proffered evidence, not to accept reflexively its litigation 
position.”304 
Ultimately, the majority held that the heightened justifiable need 
requirement to carry a handgun for self-defense qualified as a 
presumptively lawful, longstanding regulation and as such did not burden 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment.305  Further, even if this 
regulation failed to qualify as presumptively lawful, it passed intermediate 
scrutiny and was constitutional.306  While the Third Circuit here reached the 
same conclusion as the Second and Fourth Circuits discussed above, it did 
so through a very different analysis and relied on nearly no evidence put 
forth by the State.307  Thus, the dissent convincingly attacked both modes of 
the majority’s analysis, leaving the decision on weak footing for subsequent 
challenges. 
C.   Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry Are Unconstitutional 
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, the two remaining courts to have 
considered the constitutionality of restrictions on carrying a concealed 
firearm, both found the respective county or state requirements 
unconstitutional. 
 
 300. Id. (citation omitted). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 454 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 419 
(4th Cir. 2012)). 
 303. Alex Poor, Bearing the Burden of Denial:  Observations of Lower Court Decisions 
Misapplying Supreme Court Precedent in Second Amendment Cases, 67 SMU L. REV. 401, 
423–24 (2014). 
 304. Drake, 724 F.3d at 454 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the government had not borne its burden under intermediate scrutiny because 
“the District needs to present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its 
predictive judgments”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the government had not borne its burden under intermediate scrutiny because “the 
government has offered numerous plausible reasons why the disarmament of domestic 
violence misdemeanants is substantially related to an important government goal; however, 
it has not attempted to offer sufficient evidence to establish a substantial relationship 
between [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) and an important governmental goal”)). 
 305. Id. at 439–40 (majority opinion). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See supra notes 271, 291 and accompanying text. 
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1.   Ninth Circuit:  Striking Down a “Good Cause” Requirement 
In Peruta v. County of San Diego, San Diego’s “good cause” requirement 
for obtaining a concealed carry permit was struck down by the Ninth 
Circuit as unconstitutional.308  Open carry is completely prohibited in San 
Diego County,309 and it is against this generally restrictive regime that the 
“unconstitutionality of the County’s restrictive interpretation of ‘good 
cause’ becomes apparent.”310  Although the Second Amendment does not 
require states to allow concealed carry, it does “require that the states 
permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the home.”311  
Historically, social convention has dictated which form of carry a state 
allows.312  California’s preference for concealed carry as opposed to open 
carry is constitutional, “so long as it allows one of the two.”313 
Although the county’s regulation did not deny all individuals the right to 
bear arms in public,314 the court noted its inquiry does not end merely 
because a small group of individuals may exercise this right.315  Thus, the 
court determined not whether San Diego’s interpretation of the state’s good 
cause requirement “allow[ed] some people to bear arms outside the home in 
some places at some times” but whether the “typical responsible, law-
abiding citizen” was able to carry a firearm in public for self-defense.316  In 
San Diego, good cause was defined as “[a] set of circumstances that 
distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be 
placed in harm’s way.”317  The court found that in San Diego, a “typical” 
law-abiding citizen “fearing for his personal safety—by definition—cannot 
 
 308. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text for summary of the California 
statute.  A license may be issued if:  “(1) The applicant is of good moral character.  (2) Good 
cause exists for issuance of the license.  (3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a city 
within the county . . . .  (4) The applicant has completed a course of training . . . .”  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 26150 (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
 309. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25850, 26350. 
 310. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).  The dissent 
believes the majority misidentifies the conduct at issue because the majority puts too much 
weight on the fact that California prohibits open carry of firearms in public (making the right 
to carry concealed firearms that much more imperative).  It frames the issue as “whether a 
responsible, law-abiding citizen has a right under the Second Amendment to carry a firearm 
in public for self-defense,” while the dissent asserts that the conduct at issue is more narrow–
carrying a concealed firearm in public, notwithstanding prohibitions on open carry. Id. at 
1181–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 311. Id. at 1172 (majority opinion). 
 312. Id. See also supra notes 96–99, 107–09 and accompanying text for discussion on 
preference of concealed versus open carry. 
 313. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1172. 
 314. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25450 (West Supp. 2014) (peace officers), § 25455 
(retired peace officers), § 25620 (military personnel), § 25650 (retired federal officers), 
§ 26035 (on private property or place of business), § 26040 (where hunting is allowed), 
§ 26045 (when faced with “immediate, grave danger” in the “brief interval before and after 
the local law enforcement agency . . . has been notified of the danger and before the arrival 
of its assistance”), § 26050 (attempting to make a lawful arrest). 
 315. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1169. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 1148. 
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distinguish [himself] from the mainstream.”318  Thus, San Diego County’s 
heightened permit requirement “impermissibly infringe[d] on the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms in lawful self-defense.”319 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit’s 
determinations that their respective state’s heightened requirements were 
substantially related to governmental interests.320  The court offered two 
reasons why these circuits inappropriately applied intermediate scrutiny.321  
First, their analyses were “near-identical to the freestanding ‘interest-
balancing inquiry’” explicitly rejected by the majority in Heller.322  
According to the Ninth Circuit, the courts improperly relied on the 
“legislatures’ determinations weighing the government’s interest in public 
safety against an individual’s interest in his Second Amendment right to 
bear arms.”323  Second, the circuit courts deferred to the state legislature too 
readily.324  The Ninth Circuit asserted that the Second, Third, and Fourth 
Circuits misinterpreted and misapplied their citation to Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC325 “for the proposition that courts must 
afford deference to legislative findings.”326  The Ninth Circuit explained 
that Turner instructs courts to apply deference only when determining 
whether a “real harm” exists that amounts to an “important government[al] 
interest.”327  But when “assessing ‘the fit between the asserted interests and 
the means chosen to advance them’” (i.e., prong two of the Marzzarella 
test), the Turner court did not afford the legislature such deference.328  
Instead, the Court required the state to “prove that the statute did not burden 
the right ‘substantially more . . . than is necessary to further [the 
government’s legitimate] interests.’”329  The Ninth Circuit asserted that in 
 
 318. Id. at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 319. Id. at 1179. 
 320. See id. at 1175–78 (critiquing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard 
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 
(2d Cir. 2012)).  Recall that the Second Circuit concluded it “owed ‘substantial deference to 
the predictive judgments of [the legislature]’ regarding the degree of fit between the 
regulations and the public interest they aimed to serve.” Id. at 1176 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97).  The Third Circuit “deferred to the legislature’s 
judgment that the permitting regulations would serve its interest in ensuring public safety 
even though ‘New Jersey [could not] present[] [the court] with much evidence to show how 
or why its legislators arrived at this predictive judgment.’” Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting Drake, 724 F.3d at 437).  The Fourth Circuit “relied on the legislature’s judgment 
that ‘reduc[ing] the number of handguns carried in public’ would increase public safety and 
prevent crime, despite conflicting evidence on the issue.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879–82). 
 321. See id. at 1176–77. 
 322. Id. at 1176 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35, 689–90 
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 323. Id. (citing Drake, 724 F.3d at 439; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 880; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 
at 100). 
 324. Id. at 1177. 
 325. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
 326. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1177. 
 327. Id. (citing Turner, 520 U.S. at 195). 
 328. Id. (quoting Turner, 520 U.S. at 213) (emphasis added). 
 329. Id. (quoting Turner, 520 U.S. at 214) (alteration in original). 
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all three circuit courts, the state failed to satisfy this burden, and the 
heightened permit requirements should have been held unconstitutional.330 
In the end, the Ninth Circuit held that because a citizen’s ability to carry 
firearms in public was restricted by a dual regulation (i.e., heightened 
requirements for concealed carry permits and full ban on open carry), a 
citizen in effect had no ability to carry firearms in public.331  Thus, the good 
cause requirement, as interpreted by San Diego County, was found 
unconstitutional.332 
2.   Seventh Circuit:   Dismantling a Wholesale Ban 
The Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Madigan found that Illinois’s law 
regarding carrying firearms in public, which in effect constituted a “flat 
ban,” was an unconstitutional burden on the Second Amendment.333  This 
law differed significantly from those discussed in the previous four cases, 
as the statute did not include a heightened permit requirement per se.  
Rather, the statute at issue here was reminiscent of the District of 
Columbia’s stringent law at issue in Heller.334  Judge Posner acknowledged 
that the state faced a high burden in justifying such a Draconian law.335  
The court referenced a previous case, United States v. Skoien,336 in which 
the government had to make a “strong showing” that a restriction on 
firearm possession was essential, and not merely a rational means, for 
protecting public safety.337  The state in Moore had a greater burden for this 
showing than in Skoien, where the regulation curtailed gun rights of 
individuals convicted of domestic violence;338 here, the regulation curtailed 
the rights of “the entire law-abiding adult population of Illinois.”339  Given 
the stringency of this statute, the court rejected adopting a particular level of 
scrutiny.340  Rather, a restriction with the breadth of Illinois’s law had to be 
 
 330. See id. at 1177–78. 
 331. See supra notes 312–19 and accompanying text. 
 332. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1179. 
 333. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).  See supra note 144 
and accompanying text for summary of the Illinois statute. 
 334. The Illinois statute forbade a person from carrying a firearm in any location other 
than his home or business, or in the home of another when invited, unless the firearm was 
“broken down in a non-functioning state; or [was] not immediately accessible; or [was] 
unloaded and enclosed in a case . . . .” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4)(i)–(iii) (West 
Supp. 2010), invalidated by Moore, 702 F.3d at 933. 
 335. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (“[S]o substantial a curtailment of the right of armed 
self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might 
benefit on balance from such a curtailment, though there is no proof it would.  In contrast, 
when a state bans guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can 
preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places; since that’s a 
lesser burden, the state doesn’t need to prove so strong a need.”). 
 336. 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 337. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (discussing Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–44). 
 338. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 639. 
 339. Moore, 702 F.3d at 940. 
 340. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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upheld on a positive showing of legitimacy, not “merely on the ground that 
it’s not irrational.”341 
The parties presented empirical evidence in an attempt to illustrate the 
connection between substantial firearm regulation and increased public 
safety, but Judge Posner concluded that the relationship was unclear.342  
Indeed, scholars have found no conclusive evidence from “national law 
assessments, cross-national comparisons, and index studies” to determine 
whether stringent firearm regulation is related to decreased violence.343  
Some scholars have gone so far as to comment that even if the concealed 
carry laws were weakened, it is unlikely that the net effect on crime would 
be large.344  In addition, the court notes that minimal impact on public 
safety would occur if courts invalidated restrictive permit requirements 
because (1) gun possession is concentrated in rural and suburban areas 
where crime rates are relatively low, (2) these populations are at a lower 
risk of victimization than individuals in urban areas, and (3) permit holders 
are at a relatively low risk of misusing guns.345  While Judge Posner 
conceded that some studies found that an increase in gun ownership may 
cause increased murder rates,346 he notes that the issue in Moore was not 
ownership, but public carry.347  Furthermore, an increase in gun ownership 
is not necessarily a consequence of allowing concealed carry.348  
Ultimately, the court was unconvinced that “the empirical literature on the 
effects of allowing the carriage of guns in public . . . establish[es] a 
pragmatic defense of the Illinois law.”349 
On the other hand, the dissent pointed out “the legislature acted within its 
authority” when it enacted a ban, as opposed to a permitting system, on 
concealed carry because empirical evidence, albeit conflicted, supported 
this conclusion.350  Consistent with the deferential conclusions reached by 
 
 341. Moore, 702 F.3d at 939 (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 
2011)).  The state had to provide the court with “more than merely a rational basis for 
believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.” Id. at 
942. 
 342. See id. at 936–39. 
 343. Id. at 937 (quoting Robert A. Hahn et al., Firearms Laws and the Reduction of 
Violence:  A Systematic Review, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 40, 59 (2005) (noting that the 
net effect of crime rates by permitting the carry of firearms in public is inconclusive)). 
 344. Id. at 938 (citing Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control 
After Heller:  Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1041, 1082 (2009)). 
 345. See id. at 937–38 (citing Cook, Ludwig & Samaha, supra note 344, at 1082). 
 346. See id. at 938 (citing Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 
1086, 1106–07 (2001)). 
 347. See id. 
 348. See id. (citing Duggan, supra note 346, at 1106–07). 
 349. Id. at 939 (citing James Bishop, Hidden or on the Hip:  The Right(s) to Carry After 
Heller, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 922–23 (2012)). 
 350. Id. at 953 (Williams, J., dissenting).  “[G]un possession by urban adults was 
associated with a significantly increased risk of being shot in an assault.” Id. at 951 (citing 
Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 99 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009)).  “[I]n states with broad concealed-carry laws there 
is an increased chance that one will be a victim of violent crime.” Id. (referencing three 
studies in particular). 
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the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, the dissent’s opinion stated that 
“‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the 
evidence’ does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial 
evidence.”351 
However, the Seventh Circuit’s majority may not have been in absolute 
disagreement with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, as Judge Posner 
called upon the Illinois legislature to create a new gun law that imposed 
reasonable limitations.352  The Seventh Circuit appeared partial to New 
York’s “moderate [regulatory] approach” reviewed in Kachalsky v. County 
of Westchester.353  The Seventh Circuit commented that other jurisdictions 
found proper balance between individual rights and public safety by 
“limit[ing] the right to carry a gun to responsible persons rather than to ban 
public carriage altogether . . . .”354  New York, for example, placed the 
burden on the applicant to demonstrate a particularized need.355  Because 
the court believed that some statute was necessary to regulate the state’s 
firearm regime, the court stayed its mandate for 180 days and directed the 
legislature to enact a new law that would “impose reasonable limitations, 
consistent with the public safety and the Second Amendment as interpreted 
in this opinion, on the carrying of guns in public.”356  The Illinois 
legislature enacted a new law in 2013.357  However, this licensing scheme 
may not have been the regulation Judge Posner had in mind when endorsing 
“reasonable limitations” because the new statute imposes no heightened 
permit requirement.358 
IV.   TAKING AIM AT THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ DECISIONS 
This part evaluates and critiques the analysis of the circuit courts in their 
decisions regarding concealed carry permit requirements.  One common 
theme emerges:  courts must defer to legislative policy decisions only after 
exercising critical judgment and not blindly rely on legislatures’ 
determinations.  A key strategy for exercising critical judgment is to 
demand that the legislature put forth empirical evidence that the state may 
use to satisfy its burden of proof.  A citizen’s Second Amendment right 
should not be restricted for the sake of public safety unless empirical 
evidence demonstrates that this infringement benefits the greater public. 
 
 351. Id. at 952 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 211 (1997)); see 
also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2012) (acknowledging 
various studies on the relationship between handgun access, violent crime, safety, and 
character of public places before noting “[i]t is the legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh 
conflicting evidence and make policy judgments”). 
 352. Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (majority opinion). See supra notes 146–48 and 
accompanying text discussing the permit requirement after Moore. 
 353. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 940–41 (discussing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 81). 
 354. Id. at 940. 
 355. Id. at 941. 
 356. Id. at 942. 
 357. See Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/10 (West 2014). 
 358. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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This Note does not assert that the judiciary itself should embark on a 
policy inquiry over the benefit or harm of firearm restriction, but rather that 
the judiciary should hold state legislatures accountable for their policy 
considerations. 
The Third Circuit decision of Drake v. Filko illustrates an instance where 
the court blindly deferred to the legislature and ignored precedents dictating 
that the burden of proof is on the state to demonstrate that the statute’s 
restriction is reasonably linked to public safety.359  The New Jersey 
legislature offered no evidence that a justifiable need requirement in the 
state’s concealed carry statute would enhance public safety, and thus the 
state was unable to satisfy its burden of proof.360  However, the court still 
deferred to the legislative finding.361  The dissent pointed out that this 
deference was completely unwarranted and that the court was remiss in its 
duties by accepting the state’s argument without question.362  The state bore 
the burden of proof363 but failed to present an ounce of evidence to support 
the link between a “justifiable need” requirement and public safety, yet the 
court still upheld the statute.364 
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, deferred to the legislature after the 
state proffered legitimate reasons based on empirical evidence for the 
legislature’s policy decision.365  The Maryland legislature had codified 
findings to defend the “good and substantial reason” requirement for 
obtaining a concealed carry permit, demonstrating that the House gave 
significant thought to its policy decision.366  The court undertook a 
thorough analysis of the concealed carry statute and applied a textbook 
intermediate scrutiny analysis to ultimately find the law constitutional.367  
Similarly, the Second Circuit deferred to the legislature only after 
acknowledging that empirical research was inadequate to invalidate the 
current law.368  The state satisfied its burden by demonstrating that a 
relationship existed between the “proper cause” requirement and public 
safety.369  Because both of these courts explicitly adopted intermediate 
scrutiny, the state did not face an extremely high hurdle in order to justify 
its laws.  Nonetheless, the courts adequately scrutinized the legislatures’ 
decisions, ensuring that citizens’ Second Amendment rights were burdened 
to the least extent possible. 
The Seventh Circuit also considered empirical evidence in favor of 
restricting concealed carry but came to the opposite conclusion—that the 
 
 359. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 222, 291 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 292–97 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 298–304 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra Part III.B.2.  The court first identified whether public safety was a 
legitimate state interest and then determined whether the heightened permit requirement was 
substantially related to this interest. 
 368. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
2798 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
statute banning concealed carry was unconstitutional.370  However, these 
circuit court decisions are not irreconcilable; the stringency of Illinois’s 
statute was the determinative factor in it being found unconstitutional 
because the state would have had to provide very compelling evidence to 
justify a wholesale ban on public carry.371  The concealed carry statute was 
simply too restrictive to justify for the sake of public safety.372  Despite the 
fact that a simplistic analysis could have invalidated this law, Judge Posner 
chose to consider research presented by both parties.373  Ultimately, reliable 
evidence demonstrating a positive relationship between concealed carry and 
violence did not exist to justify a complete ban on carrying firearms in 
public.  Had the Seventh Circuit’s concealed carry statute not been a 
wholesale ban on firearms in public but rather a “proper cause” or 
“justifiable need” requirement found in other circuits, it is quite possible 
that the Seventh Circuit would have found such a statute constitutional.374 
The Ninth Circuit’s outcome was most similar to the Seventh Circuit in 
that it invalidated San Diego County’s concealed carry regulation;375 
however, the opinion in fact is an outlier among the cases reviewed in this 
Note because the Ninth Circuit approached the challenge to a concealed 
carry law in a fundamentally different way.  Rather than viewing the 
Second Amendment right as one that may be infringed for the sake of 
public safety, the court did not consider any state interest at all.  By not 
engaging in any level of constitutional scrutiny, the court had no potential 
to identify any important government end.376  Furthermore, California is not 
the only jurisdiction explicitly prohibiting open carry, a determinative fact 
in the court’s holding that restrictions on concealed carry were 
unconstitutional.377  New York, for example, also prohibited open carry, so 
it is curious why California placed such great emphasis on this restriction 
while the Second Circuit found it insignificant.  It may stem from a 
fundamentally different understanding of the Second Amendment 
altogether.  The Ninth Circuit’s holding implies that all law-abiding citizens 
have the right to carry a firearm in public if they desire to do so,378 while 
the Second Circuit is willing to compromise a citizen’s right if it enhances 
public safety.379  Because of this belief, the Ninth Circuit did not consider 
 
 370. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 371. See supra notes 337–43 and accompanying text; see also Young, supra note 193, at 
63. 
 372. See supra notes 339–49 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 342–49 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 353–56 and accompanying text.  Judge Posner states that New 
York’s proper cause requirement struck a proper balance between individual rights and 
public safety. See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 376. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 377. Two other states considered in this Note also prohibit open carry of firearms:  New 
York and Illinois. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2) (McKinney 2008) (permitting system 
did not have a category allowing for open carry); see also 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
66/10(c)(1) (West 2014) (allowing individual with a license to carry a loaded or unloaded 
firearm fully or partially concealed only). 
 378. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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evidence in support of a heightened restriction and in fact criticized the 
other circuits for deferring to the state legislatures.380 
A legislature’s assessment of empirical evidence will help legitimize its 
policy decision to impose a particular restriction.  Bolstering a legislative 
decision with factual data better equips a court to assess the 
constitutionality of such a statute.  Moreover, a court that holds the 
legislature to a high standard by requiring justification for its decision 
ensures an appropriate level of legislative deference.  While the court 
should not impose its own judgment upon policy decisions reserved for the 
legislature, it is important for courts to retain their analytic integrity and 
exercise a degree of skepticism when evaluating a legislature’s reasoning 
for adopting such a statute.  Research conflicts over the issue of gun control 
and public safety; however, courts’ thorough review of a legislature’s 
decisions increases the chance that Second Amendment rights will only be 
infringed when such regulation does in fact enhance public safety. 
CONCLUSION 
After Heller’s landmark decision establishing the Second Amendment’s 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense in the home,381 lower courts 
have struggled to interpret this holding for application to the vast frontier 
outside of the home.  In the case of concealed firearms, five circuit courts 
have spoken on the constitutionality of statutory restrictions on concealed 
carry, with three of them finding that heightened requirements for obtaining 
a permit are constitutional.382  However, with many similar challenges 
brewing in lower courts, it remains to be seen whether the trend of 
validating such regulations will continue. 
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